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. SEND ORIGINAL TO: JNDUST COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. . 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Sohar Chavez 
880 N. Oregon St. #15 
Ontaiio, OR 97914 
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 541-212-8 802 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury) 
Kevin Stokes 
P.O. Box 584 
New Plymouth, Idaho 83655 
 I 
CLAIMANT'S BIRTHDA TE 
 
CLAIMANT'S 
 SECURITY NO. 
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
Idaho, Payette County 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED) 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME. ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
Richard S. Owen 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Uninsured 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFEST A T!ON OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
9/8/12 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN A VERA GE WEEKLY WAGE 
OF: $400. 00, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419 
I was moving irrigation lines, slipped and my left hand fell in the chain of the motor. 
NA TUR£ OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
My left pinky was amputated. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TlME? 
Compensability of the case. 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
9/8/12 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: [RI ORAL 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED 
Compensability of case; determination of need for medical 
care and reimbursement for the cost thereof; assessment of 
attorney's fees for uninsured status; determination of extent 
of total temporary disability benefits, need for retraining, 
determination of permanent partial impairment; 
determination of permanent partial disability which may be 
total and permanent which accounts for all medical and non-
medical factors and retention of jurisdiction past the statute 
of limitations. 
Kevin Stokes 
D WRJTTEN 0 OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? 0 YES [RI NO . )r SO, PL'EASE STA TE WHY. 
I 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORIVI 1.C. 1002 
IC1001 (Rev. J/01/2004) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Complaint - Page I of 3 
Appendix 1 
PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME A )RESS) 
St. Alphonsus RMC 
1055 N. Curtis Rd. 
Idaho 83706 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HA VE YOU INCURRED TO DA TE? 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER IF ANY? $ Unknown WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HA VE YOU !FANY? 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [RI YES D NO 
DATE ( O·.-q . .- SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY fL ~ ~~ 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY DATE OF DEATH RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT FILING COMPLAINT 
WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? I DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? DYES ONO DYES ONO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of October, 2012, I eaused to be served a true and eorrect copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
New Plymouth, Idaho 83655 
via: D personal service of process via: D personal service ofproeess 
X regular U.S. Mail X regular U.S. Mail 
NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form I.C. 1003 
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid 
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may he entered! 
Further information maybe obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000. 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3) 
Complaint Page 2 of 3 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSI 
POBOX83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0041 
Patient Name: .r Chavez 
 2 
Address: 880 N. Oregon St. #15, Ontario, OR 97914 
Phone Number: 541-212-8802 
 or Case Number: 
 
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number: ________ _ 
0 Pick up Copies O Fax Copies 
# _ ___ _ _ 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH mFORMATION 
I hereby authorize - ---- --- --- --- --- --- to disclose realth information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific f or each provider 
To: 
------- ---- --- - --- ----- - - - - --- --- --- ----- -1 n s u ran c e Comp any/Third Party Administrator/Self Insured Employ er/ISIF, their attorneys or patients attorney 
Street Address 
Ci(y State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for data: _ ___ ___ _ _ ___ ___ ___ ___ _________ __ _ 
( e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim ) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: _ _ ___ _ _ ___ _ 
D Discharge Summary 
D History & Physical Exam 
D Consultation Reports 
D Operative Reports 
D Lab 
D Pathology 
D Radiology Reports 
D Entire Record 
D Other: Specify _ _ _ ___ ___ _____ _ ___ _ _ 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable) : 
D AIDS or HIV 
D Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
D Drug/ Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law ( 45 CFR Part 164) 
and that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal 
regulations. I understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, 
except that revoking the authorization won't apply to infmmation already released in response to this authorization. I 
understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing 
this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation 
claim.. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal 
responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form 
and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this 
authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider 
specified above. 
~ -)t?k- (' ~;,rc'r~ 
Signature of Patir!'fii Date 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Signature of Witness Title Date 
Original: Medical Record Copy: Patient Complaint - Page 3 of 3 
3 
11/05/2012 15:55 20845 8 HAMILTON MI .SON PAGE 01/02 
,, ., , .. , • '. l'l"C'' ;,• '°4'""""':::.·. ··1 
, ··-: ,-.r.:t1i;l,.r.~1.11·rii· ·' ·, t" •'f"l:if >: · ·1 /?•'t11 ·rti"'lF' 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMlSSJON,.JUDTCfAL OTVJSION, P.O . .BOX 83720, BOISE, rDAHO 83720°0041 
.ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
IN.JURY 
The above-named employer or emplover/surety resl!Ol),ds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
The Industria• Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the .ISIF by stating; 
CL\IMANT'S NAMF. AND ,\!)!)RESS CLi\lMANT1S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADl)Rl!:SS 
Sohar Chavez Richard S. Owen 
880 N. Oregon St #15 P.O. Box278 
Ontario, OR 97914 Nampa, ID 83653 
~M1'1-,0s~R1S NAME AND ADD!USS WORKF.:RS' COMPF.:NSAT!ON INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
evm tokes (NOT AD,JUSTOk'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Post Office Box 584 
New Plymouth, ID 83655 
TEl,.F,PJ-lON'F. Nl,'MllEI!: 
ATTORNEY RF.PRESENTING l';MPLOYER 01! EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAMF. AND ATTORNEY REl'RllSlst'ftlNG £NDUSTRIAI, SPECIAL INDRMNITV flUND (N/\MF, 
ADDRESS) A Nil Al:11) RESS) 
Ron R. Shepherd 
HAMIL TON, MICHAELSON & HILTY, LLP 
Post Office Box 65 
Nam~~ Iii ,..,.,..,_ .... nnf':.,::; 
IT JS: (Check One 
Admitted D!!nied 
..., 
..., 
..., 
.,/ 
N/A N/A 
..., 
.J 
.J 
II 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged In the Complaint actually occurred on or about 
the time claimed-
:Z. That the employer/employee relationship e:,rlswd • 
3. That the parties were sub,ject to the provisions of tJ1e Idaho Workers' Compenmtinn Act 
4. That the condition for which henetin are daimerl was et111sed partly 
entirely by an accident ari~h1g n11t of and in the course of Clnimnn t's employment. 
5. That, ff nn occupational disease is alleged, manifet.tation of such di!!ease i~ nr was due to tlJe nat11re 
of the employment in which the hazard!i of ~uch rlisesse acnmlly exist, 11.rc clmrneteristlc of and 
peculiar to the trade, oecupation, process, or employment. 
6. That noti~ llfthe accident caushig the in,iury, or notice of the occupatfonnl disease., was given to the 
employer as soon ns practieal but not laror than 60 day~ after ~11ch accident or 60 <fays of the 
manife!.tatian of such oecnpatio,rnl dbc11se. 
7, That tbc rate of wai:cs dalmcd is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage puP.;uant h:I 
Idaho Code,§ 72·419: $ 300.00 to $350.00 per week 
8. That the alleged employer .wM in~urerl or pcrmb~ibly ~elf-insured 1mder the J.d1(bo Workers' 
Compen!l.lltion Act, 
9. What bcne'lits. if any, do you concede are rlne Clnimnnf! 
None 
IC!Ml (R~v. 3/01/ZOOR) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) 
Appcndl:i3 
05 2 1 MON 5· 
Answcr-P1111~ I of2 
[TX/RX NO 8848] 
11/05/2012 15:55 20845 HAMILTON MIC SON PAGE 02/02 
CQnti!med from front) 
I 0. State with specificity what matters are in dfapute 11nd your reason for df!l'lytn~ llubll!ty, totcthcr with any ,1fflrm!ltivc dcfcns~~. 
Claimant was a self-employed subcontractor, not an employee. 
Under the Comml1111ion rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of you..-
Answer must be mailed to the CQmmission and a copy musl: be served on all p11rties or their attorneys by rcgufar U.S. mail or by personal 
service of process. U nle.~s you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, 
as well as your~elf, the expense of a hearing. AU compensation which Is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due 
should not be withheld beca,ue I\ Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicia) Rules of Practfoe and Procedure under the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be tiled on Form J.C. 1002. 
l AM INTERESTED TNMEDlAT[NG THIS CLAlM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. 18]VES ONO 
DO VOtl 8ELIEVE 'rliJS CL/\IM PRESENTS A Nl'.'.W QUESTION Of Li\ W OR I\ COMPLfCATF.D SF.T OF FACTS? IF so. PLEASE s·r1vni:. 
No 
Amount of ComDcnsntion Paid Ill Dnte DatQd 
'7ftei? PPT/PPD TTD Medico! 
Ro: R. Shepherd ---
Print or Type Name 
PLEASECOMPLETF. CERTIF[CATE OF SERVICE 
5th November 12 I hereby cerfl'Fy fhntoi, tbc __ dny of , 20_, I Cll115Ccl to be ~crvcd a tn,c nnd oorrcct copyoftbe foreiolnl!l An~wer ttpn11: 
CLAIMANT'S NAMBAND ADDRESS 
Sohar Chavez c/o Richards. Owen 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, ID 83653 
via: pcr~<mnl ~crvkc ofprocl!R~ 
rcgirlar U.S. Man 
F;l\11'1,0Vl/;R AND SURETY'S 
NA:'vtlt AND ADDRESS 
via: pct~<mll J ~t,~lcc of procc;o~ 
r¢guhlr LS. J\llnil 
Ron R. Shepherd 
lNDUSTRTAI~ SP1!'.CIALINOEJ\1Nl1i' FUND 
(if 1tpp Hell blc) 
via: perm>nahcrvfce f)fprru:c~~ 
re~ular U.S. Mall 
Answe11-Pag0 2 of 2 
11 05/2 1 MO 1 :05 r X/RX NO 88481 
121~·712012 13: 35 20834 0 BOWEN AND BA PAGE 01/02 
p'..>nd Original To: Tndustrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, PO BOX 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 ICIOOJ {Rev. 1/01/2004) 
AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
NO. 2012-025814 INJURY DATE -'"""0.;;..;.9/...;;;.08=/=20;;;,.;;;1=2 ______ ........; 
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
0 The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAJMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
SOHAR CHAVEZ 
880 N. OREGON ST. #15 
ONTARIO, OR 97914 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
KEVIN STOKES 
POBOX584 
NEW PL YMOUHT, ID 83655 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
RICHARDS.OWEN,ESQ. 
POB0X278 
NAMPA, ID 83653 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S {NOT 
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY {NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
{NAME AND ADDRESS) ADDRESS) . 
R. DANIEL BOWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2673) 
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P. 
1311 W. JEFFERSON STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
IT IS: (Check one) 
Admitted Denied 
X 
X 
X 
X 
NIA NIA 
X 
X 
X 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the time 
claimed. 
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisiolls of the Idaho Workers' Compemation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly~ 
entirely D by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, ifan occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the 
employment in which the ha7..ards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, 
occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That the notice of the accident eausing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such 
occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Section 72-419: $ 300.00 TO $350.00 PER WEEK. 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?. 
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEDICAL EXPENSES, PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, AND POSSIBLY TEMPORARY 
DISABILITY. 
(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE} Answer-Page 1 of2 
12/17/2012 MON 9352 
v/ 
Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street, PO BOX 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 1/01/2004) 
AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
INJURY DATE _ _;;c.0;;...;.9/..;;;..08=-/;;;;;;..20;;;.;;;;1=2----------" 
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAJMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAJMA"lT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
SO HAR CHAVEZ RICHARDS. OWEN, ESQ. 
880 N. OREGON ST. #15 POBOX278 
ONTARIO, OR 97914 NAMPA, ID 83653 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRJER'S (NOT 
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
KEVIN STOKES 
PO BOX 584 
NEW PL YMOUHT, ID 83655 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORJ./EY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
ADDRESS) 
R. DANIEL BOWEN, ESQ. (]SB #2673) 
BO\VEN & BAJLEY, L.L.P. 
1311 W. JEFFERSON STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
IT IS: (Check one) 
Admitted Denied 
X 
X 
X 
X 
NIA NIA 
X 
X 
X 
(NAME AND ADDRESS) 
-· 
C ' 
,,'.:,,... 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually oaiimed on _o.r. about the time 
claimed. 
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly~ 
entirely D by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the 
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, 
occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such 
occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Section 72-419: $ 300.00 TO $350.00 PER WEEK. 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?. 
REASONABLE At"\JD NECESSARY MEDICAL EXPENSES, PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, AND POSSIBLY TEMPORARY 
DISABILITY. 
(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Answer-Page 
(Contim1ed from front) 
10. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
L WHETHER THE HELlCOPTER TRANSPORT OF CLAIMANT WAS REASONABLE AND NECESSARY PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 
§72-432. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of your Answer must be mailed 
to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should 
pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due 
and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule lll(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form LC. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING TIIIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. XYES NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
REASONABLENESS AND NECESSITY OF LIFEFLIGHT SERVICES EXCEEDING $21,000.00 FOR A NON-DOMINANT HAND LITTLE 
FINGER AMPUTATION. 
Amount of Compensation paid to date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD TTD Medical ?t?.£~~ -0- -0- -0 /oJ /; '7-/JJ 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
.;A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _lflay of December, 2012, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
via 
RICHARDS. OWEN, ESQ 
POB0X278 
NAMPA, ID 83653 
FAX: (208) 3399 
personal service of process 
[J regular U.S. mail 
~ facsimile J (). ~3=--~~ 
Answer-Page 
SOHAR 
Claimant, 
V. 
KEVIN STOKES, 
Employer, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
INTRODUCTION 
IC 2012-025814 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND RECOMMENDATION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the 
above entitled matter to Referee Michael E. Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on 
October 30, 2013. Claimant was not present but was represented by Richard S. Owen of 
Nampa who appeared on Claimant's behalf. R. Daniel Bowen of Boise represented 
uninsured Employer, Kevin Stokes, who was also present. Oral and documentary evidence 
was presented. No post-hearing depositions were taken and the parties waived their 
opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs. This matter came under advisement on 
November 6, 2013. and is now ready for decision. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whether the transport of Claimant by St. Alphonsus 
Life Flight (Life Flight) constituted reasonable medical care pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 72-432. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 
CONTENTIONS OF 
Claimant contends that Life Flight's bill incurred in transporting him from the work 
site where the tip of his left small finger was partially amputated was not reasonable and he 
should not be required to pay it. He relies on the opinion of Paul C. Collins, M.D. 
Employer agrees that the charge is unreasonable under the circumstances of 
Claimant's injury. 
Life Flight has not appeared in this matter, even though Defense counsel sent 
certified letters to the two addresses listed on the invoice Life Flight sent to Claimant 
indicating that there was a problem with the bill and that a hearing was set for October 30, 
2013 in Boise. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Employer, Kevin Stokes, taken at the hearing. 
2. Claimant's Exhibits A and B, admitted at the hearing. 
3. Employer's Exhibits 1-10, admitted at the hearing. 
After having considered all the above evidence, the Referee submits the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was employed by Employer as a part-time irrigator. On September 
8, 2012, Claimant suffered a partial amputation of his left small finger when his left had 
slipped into the chain of a motor on the irrigation line he was moving in the 
Payette/Fruitland area. 
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2. Payette County EMTs arrived at the scene of Claimant's accident. 
Apparently, it was determined that Claimant's small finger was salvageable, so Life Flight 
was called and transported Claimant to St. Alphonsus hospital in Boise. As it turned out, 
the tip of Claimant's finger could not be reattached. 
3. Life Flight sent Claimant a bill for $21,201.00 for the transport. 
4. Although not insured for workers' compensation purposes on the advice of 
his accountant, to his credit Employer has paid all of Claimant's medical bills and associate 
benefits. The only bill not paid is the one from Life Flight. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
Idaho Code § 72-432(1) obligates an employer to provide an injured worker with 
reasonable medical, surgical, or other treatment immediately following an injury and for a 
reasonable time thereafter 
5. Both parties hereto agree that it was not reasonable to life flight Claimant to 
a hospital in Boise when Claimant's injury occurred approximately 15 minutes from Holy 
Rosary Hospital in Ontario, Oregon. 
6. Employer testified that he owns a farm in Fruitland and employed Claimant 
as a part-time irrigator. On September 8, 2012, Employer received a call from Payette 
County Dispatch that Claimant had been injured. Claimant got his left hand caught in the 
chain/sprocket mechanism on an irrigation line and crushed the tip of his left small finger. 
Upon his arrival at the accident scene, Employer observed three Payette County 
paramedics, and a deputy sheriff. Employer testified as follows regarding his observations: 
Q. (By Mr. Bowen): When you got there, what was Mr. Chavez's 
situation? 
A. He was sitting on a bench on the deck of the sheriff deputy's 
house. One of the paramedics had his hand up in the air, had Mr. Chavez's 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 3 
hand up the air, elevated. It was bandaged. You know, I talked to him 
briefly, Mr. Chavez, asked, you know, how he was, and then tried to talk to 
the paramedics, you know, what's happening, you know, what are we doing 
now. They didn't respond to me, basically brushed me off, but eventually 
one of the paramedics who was brand new on the job said she didn't know 
what was happening, so ... 
Q. The reason you were inquiring was you were wondering why 
he wasn't already being taken to Holy Rosary? 
A. Exactly. You know, like I said, you know, they had him 
already bandaged and, you know, their ambulance was sitting there, you 
know, five, ten yards away and, you know, doors open, and I thought well, 
let's get him going, you know, and like I said, no one would answer me. I 
asked the sheriff's deputy and he said the bird was on its way, and that's 
when I asked, you know, why and no one would answer that. I got nothing 
from anyone after that. 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 20-21. 
7. After the above transpired, Employer made the trip from the scene of 
Claimant's accident three times each at different times of the day. 1 He calculated the 
distance by his odometer at 9.8 miles to the helipad at Holy Rosary. At noontime, 
Employer made the trip in 15 minutes. The quickest time, 12 minutes, occurred around 
5 :00 p.m. Employer did not exceed the posted speed limit on any of his "test runs." It can 
be reasonably inferred that an ambulance in full emergency mode could make the trip in 
less time that Employer. 
8. According to the EMT report, an off-duty Payette County paramedic 
contacted "Medic 20" and was advised that the fingertip may be "surgically fixed" and Life 
Flight was requested to "launch." See, Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
9. Claimant was life-flighted to St. Alphonsus emergency department where he 
came under the care of hand specialist Mark Clawson, M.D., who deemed Claimant's 
finger irreparable and performed a revision amputation. 
1 According to the EMT report, Claimant's accident happened at about 5 :00 p.m. 
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10. In an April 9, 2013 to Employer's counsel, Paul Collins, M.D., an 
orthopedic surgeon practicing is Boise, opined: 
Having reviewed the case and specifically, as an example, the x-ray 
report of 09/08/12, it is evident that this is a 5th finger crushing/tearing type 
injury that was not in any way, shape or form, life critical. For that reason I 
do not understand why Life Flight was called or addressed in the first place, 
and why the case was not taken to Holy Rosary. Indeed, it is extremely 
reasonable that the patient would be taken physically to Holy Rosary 
Hospital. Had there been an incident which may in some way benefitted 
from a vascular reconstruction, then the patient could be transferred to St. 
Alphonsus or St. Luke's. Indeed, this was in no way necessary. 
Defendant's Exhibit 6, p. 55. 
11. The Referee is unable to find in the record as submitted any evidence that it 
was reasonable or necessary to life flight Claimant from near Fruitland to Boise based on 
an apparent misconception that Claimant's small fingertip could be salvaged. Even if it 
could have been salvaged, there is no evidence that such could not have been accomplished 
at Holy Rosary or that arrangements could not have been made to transfer him to St. 
Alphonsus. 
12. It is unfortunate that Life Flight did not appear and defend itself in this 
matter. Nonetheless, the Referee is convinced that counsel for Employer exercised due 
diligence in attempting to locate them and providing them with a letter fully explaining 
Employer's position, as well as the Notice of Hearing and other pleadings. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Idaho Industrial Commission has jurisdiction in this matter. See, Idaho 
Code§§ 72-209 and 211. 
2. Neither Employer nor Claimant is liable for payment of the invoice for Life 
Flight services in the amount of $21,201.00. See, Defendant's Exhibit 8. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Recommendation, the Referee recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and 
conclusions as its own and issue an appropriate final order. 
DATED this /0-ffl_ day of March, 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 2014, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICHARD S OWEN 
POBOX278 
NAMPA ID 83653 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701-1007 
ge 
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Richard Owen 
PO Box 278 
Nampa, ID 83653 
R Daniel Bowen 
PO Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701-1007 
INDUSTRIAL 
PO Box 83720 
Boise. ID 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6000 - FAX ('.'08) 334-2321 
1-800-9 50-2 l JO 
April 7, 2014 
Re: Sohar Chavez v. Kevin Stokes 
IC 2012-025814 
Dear Mr. Owen and Mr. Bowen: 
COMMISSJONERS 
Thomas F Baskin. Chairman 
K D. Maynard 
Thomas E Limbaugh 
Mindy Montgomery. Director 
The Commissioners have received Referee Powers' recommendation in the above entitled case. 
As we reviewed the same, we have concluded that decision on the case would be advanced by 
some briefing on the following issue. 
The parties seem to be in agreement that the care in question is unreasonable. Mr. Owen has 
acknowledged that Claimant may be sued in the civil arena by the provider, but takes the 
position that by treating the reasonableness issue, the Commission has assumed jurisdiction, and 
that jurisdiction is exclusive. In other words, the Commission's decision to treat the issue means 
the district court cannot. The Commission is not convinced that this result necessarily follows. 
If the Commission determines that the treatment is umeasonable, thus freeing Employer from the 
obligation of payment, is the Claimant exposed to civil action for collection of the bill? 
How is this case different than the following scenario: Claimant suffers a compensable low back 
injury. Medical care is provided up to a point, but surety eventually denies further care. 
Claimant goes off on his own and receives extensive additional care. Later, he seeks the 
Commission's determination that such care was needed and reasonable. The Commission finds 
the care was umeasonable. Would anybody argue that Claimant is not on the hook for the 
expenses in question? Does it matter that in one scenario Claimant sought the care, while in the 
other it was simply provided? 
700 So. Clearwater Ln .. Boise, ID 
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We appreciate that the provider appears disinterested in getting paid, but is relieved 
of responsibility for payment, is it appropriate to conclude that provider is foreclosed from other 
remedy? After all, as far as we can tell, the provider is faultless in this matter; all it did was send 
an air ambulance when it received a valid request to do so. 
With these issues in mind, the Commission is asking for guidance from the parties and any 
argument you would like to present. 
Please inform us of an agreeable briefing schedule and we will issue an order. 
Thomas P. Baskin 
RICHARDS. OWEN, (ISB #2687) 
DAVID M. FARNEY, ESQ. (ISB #8926) 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
Post Office Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Telephone: (208) 466-8700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SO HAR CHAVEZ, 
Claimant, 
v. 
KEVIN STOKES, 
Uninsured, 
Employer, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I. C. No. 2012-025814 
CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby supplies this 
Supplemental Brief pursuant to the Industrial Commission's request of April 7, 2014. 
BACKGROUND 
The additional briefing supplied herein is supplied in response to a concern by the Industrial 
Commission that a decision of the Industrial Commission herein with regard to the reasonableness 
of medical care supplied to the Claimant will not have any affect upon subsequent proceedings in 
this case if it happens that the provider in this case sues the Claimant in District Court. 
Claimant is providing additional authorities herein to demonstrate that the Industrial 
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Commission herein has concurrent jurisdiction over this question with the District Court's of this 
State and a decision herein may indeed have precedential affect on any action brought in the District 
Court's of this State. 
ARGUMENT 
The seminal case of Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976), arose out of a 
situation in which a wrongful death case had been brought by the parents of a young man who died 
as a result of a reckless employer who paid the young man to go down into a mine drill shaft to make 
repairs on the employers broken equipment at the bottom of the shaft. When the young man was 
killed as a result of this endeavor the parents of the young man brought a case against the employer 
for wrongful death alleging that District Court rather than the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction 
over the claim and that the employer had breached his duty to young man under tort law. After trial, 
the jury returned a general verdict denying recovery and upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded. 
In its holding, the Supreme Court was very concerned about the jurisdictional question of 
whether or not the District Court or the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction over the question of 
whether or not the young man was within the course and scope ofhis employment at the time of the 
accident. After reviewing the jury instructions with regard to whether or not the young man was an 
employee or an independent contractor or, alternatively, a casual employee, the Supreme Court noted 
that it appeared clear that the resolution of these factual issues was the key to determining whether 
or not the Industrial Commission or the District Court had jurisdiction. 
Because the question of jurisdiction was submitted to the jury, and those issues had become 
intermingled with the factual determinations, the Supreme Court remanded the case with additional 
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instructions on the jurisdictional issue upon remand. In this regard, the Court held as follows: 
"Although the Industrial Commission and the district court have 
mutually exclusive jurisdiction for the award of benefits to an injured 
Claimant or damages to an injured plaintiff, they have concurrent 
jurisdiction to determine whether they have jurisdiction to consider 
the claim or hear the case. Scott v. Industrial Accident Commission, 
46 Cal.2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956). As the Supreme Court of 
California said in Scott: 
'The determinations of the commission, like those of 
the superior court, are res judicata in all subsequent 
proceedings, including court actions, between the 
same parties or those privy to them. [Citations 
omitted). Thus, if there is a final determination as to 
the matter of coverage (i.e., of jurisdiction) in either 
the commission or the superior court proceedings, 
such determination will be res judicata in subsequent 
proceedings before the other tribunal between the 
same parties or those privy to them.' 
293 P.2d at 22. 
We adopt this rule for Idaho. Furthermore, because the wrongful 
death statute has been interpreted so that persons suing under the 
statute can recover damages only if the decedent could have 
recovered for his injuries if he had lived, we hold that the plaintiffs 
in this case would be bound by an Industrial Commission 
determination of jurisdiction to which the decedent's estate was a 
party. (Citations omitted). On the other hand, an Industrial 
Commission determination that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider the claim would be conclusive upon the defendant that the 
decedent's employment relation was outside the scope of coverage of 
the Workmen's Compensation Law." 
Based upon this decision, several other court decisions find that many basic questions arising 
under the Worker's Compensation Law can also be decided by District Court and that both the 
Commission and the Court has concurrent jurisdiction. In the case of Brooks v. Standard Fire 
Insurance Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238 (1990), the Supreme Court was concerned with a 
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worker's compensation case in which two sureties had been involved in a dispute about which surety 
should cover the Claimant Brooks injury. One surety had paid the benefits and discovering 
additional proof about causation, brought a case against the other surety for reimbursement. The 
second surety alleged that the Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to determine whether 
or not reimbursement was owed and claimed that the case should have been brought in District 
Court. 
In discussing the jurisdiction question, the Court cited to the Anderson v. Gailey decision, 
supra, and noted that Idaho Code 72-707 gives the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to determine 
all questions arising under the Worker's Compensation Law. Further, the Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
"In Anderson v. Gailey, this Court also adopted the rule that the 
decision of the tribunal in which the questions of jurisdiction is first 
filed shall prevail and as to that issue, the question is res judicata. 
The question of which of the two sureties is responsible for the 
claimant's injury is a 'question arising under this law' as provided in 
LC. Sec. 72-707, and is a proper case to be determined by the 
Industrial Commission. Unless error is shown on appeal, the 
Industrial Commission's ruling is res judicata as to the issue of 
jurisdiction. We hold that the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction 
to hear and rule on the claim for reimbursement and contribution 
between sureties." 
Given the expansive jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and the recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130 Idaho 108, 937 
P.2d 420 (1997) and Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 51, 260 P.3d 1186 (2011), the 
Claimant in this matter contends that if the Industrial Commission assumes jurisdiction over the 
issue of whether or not the medical care provided to the Claimant was reasonable, that assumption 
of jurisdiction and the Industrial Commission decision on the issue would be honored by any District 
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Court presented with the issue at a later time. 
Given the expansive jurisdiction the Industrial Commission as set forth in recent the 
decisions of St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 
(1997) and Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 51,260 P.3d 1186 (2011), the Claimant in 
this matter contends that if the Industrial Commission assumes jurisdiction over the issue of whether 
or not the medical care provided to the Claimant was reasonable, that assumption of jurisdiction and 
the Industrial Commission decision on the issue regarding medical care would be honored by any 
District Court presented with the issue at a latter time. 
Clearly, if the medical provider brings a case against the Claimant in District Court at a later 
time, that prQ_Yicler m~emonstrate that the medical care at issue was reasonable and necessarily 
related in order to prove its case for compensation in the District Court. Because the issue of 
reasonableness is a common issue and could easily be decided by the Industrial Commission herein 
or by a District Court in later proceedings, Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission 
decision herein will have precedential effect in this matter depending on the resolution of certain 
other questions to be discussed later in this brief. 
Pursuant to the case of Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, 141 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 
(2005), it is apparent that the body which assumes jurisdiction over an issue of concurrent 
jurisdiction first will get the benefit of being accorded res judicata in later determinations. In other 
words, if the Industrial Commission makes the first decision on this issue, a later decision by the 
District Court will have to take the decision of the Industrial Commission into account. 
PRIVITY OF THE PARTIES 
The only question left is whether or not the District Court would find that a later case brought 
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by the healthcare provider as against the Claimant was binding as against the healthcare provider. 
depends upon whether or not the healthcare provider is in privy with the parties to the instant 
case. 
The issue of privity is a factual, not a legal determination. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 841 
P .2d 413, 122 Idaho 883 (Idaho 1992). To establish privity, it must be shown that the party sought 
to be bound by the prior judgement "derives [its] interest from one who was a party to [the former 
action] .... " Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 855 P.2d 868, 124 Idaho 31 (Idaho 1993) 
(quoting Kite v. Eckley, 48 Idaho 454,459,282 P. 868, 869 (1929)). 
Furthermore, "It is generally accepted that whether privity exiss is not simply a matter of 
relationship ... but, rather, whether the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had its legal rights 
litigated in the prior action." Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 136 P.3d 297, 
142 Idaho 826 (Idaho 2006). 
In this case, in order for privity to exist so as to bind the healthcare provider, it must be 
shown that the healthcare provider derived its interest from either the employer or the Claimant, and 
that the healthcare provider had its legal rights litigated in the present action. 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that either the Employer or the Claimant is in privity with 
the healthcare provider whose bill is at issue in this case. Stated differently, it does not appear that 
either the Employer or the Claimant in this matter have argued a position that is the same that the 
healthcare provider would have argued in this matter or that there is any contractual or legal 
foundation for connecting the Employer or the employee with the healthcare provider in a legal 
sense. 
It therefore appears that there is no privity as between either of the parties to this litigation 
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and the healthcare provider. 
This means that the Industrial Commission's decision would not bind the healthcare provider 
in subsequent litigation in District Court unless the Industrial Commission includes the healthcare 
provider in this litigation. 
Because this has not been done, the effect of the Industrial Commission's decision herein 
would be limited. While it may have some persuasive effect in a case subsequently brought in 
District Court, it would not be legally binding upon the provider and the Claimant could still be 
liable for the bill in a case brought in District Court by the medical provider. 
Claimant therefore requests that the Industrial Commission consider bringing the medical 
provider into this case affording that provider a chance to file briefs and fully litigate its position in 
this matter. Otherwise, the Claimant remains exposed to liability for a bill which is clearly within 
the purview of the Idaho Industrial Commission's jurisdiction. 
Claimant would note that in the cases of Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, supra, and St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, supra, direct medical providers and sureties have been brought 
into the proceedings of the Industrial Commission to solve disputes involving injured Claimant's and 
the disbursal of their monies. Claimant contends herein that for the Industrial Commission to 
exercise its jurisdiction to include the medical provider herein would be well within the jurisdictional 
bounds of their statutory grant of authority as contained in Idaho Code 72-707. Claimant would 
therefore request that the Industrial Commission stay the proceedings herein and order thilt the 
medical provider be brought into these proceedings for full adjudication of the Commission herein. 
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DATED This __ day of April, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this i,Q day of April, 2014, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following: 
R. Daniel Bowen 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
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DANIEL BOWEN (ISB #2673) 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
1311 W. JEFFERSON 
BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701-1007 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSON OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SOHAR CHAVEZ, ) I.C. No: 2012-025814 
) 
Claimant, ) 
V. ) DEFENDANT'S 
) POST-HEARING 
KEVIN STOKES, ) BRIEF 
) 
Defendant. ) 
I. 
HISTORY OF CASE 
This case involves an individual whose pinky finger was amputated as a result of moving 
irrigation lines. The accident occurred on September 8, 2012. Claimant's employer, it turns out, 
was uninsured. Defendant Stokes received some bad advice from his accountant, and they 
resisted the claim. As a result, Claimant got a lawyer and a Complaint was filed in October of 
2012. The Answer was initially prepared and filed by a Canyon County law firm unfamiliar with 
workers' compensation. The matter found its way over to current defense counsel, at which time 
the case was reviewed with Defendant Stokes and an Amended Answer was filed admitting that 
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Claimant, an employee of his, was by the Workers' Compensation Act at the time 
injury. Thereafter, Defendant Stokes made payment for various benefits that Claimant was 
entitled to, as well as payment of penalties and fees. Defendant Stokes made his peace with the 
Industrial Commission Compliance Department, procured a workers' compensation policy, and 
paid his fines. The one thing Defendant Stokes did not want to do, and had not wanted to do 
from day one, was pay a LifeFlight bill to transport Claimant from the scene of the accident 
outside of Payette, Idaho, to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center in Boise, Idaho by 
helicopter. Defendant Stokes pointed out that a perfectly good hospital, St. Alphonsus in Ontario, 
Oregon, was 12 minutes away from the scene of the accident. 
After acceptance of the claim and payment by Defendant Employer, the matter 
technically was still in litigation, and there was a rather large bill out there, over $20,000.00. 
Claimant's counsel understood that Defendant Stokes was reticent to pay the bill and that 
Defendant did not want to proceed in a fashion that would negatively impact Claimant. Defense 
counsel advocated sitting back and taking no action in order to see what LifeFlight would do. 
Claimant's counsel was concerned that at some point in time the LifeFlight people might come 
after his client. He felt compelled to take more definitive action and requested that the matter be 
calendared to review the reasonableness and necessity of the LifeFlight service. Defendant filed 
a Response to Request for Calendaring, acknowledging that it was perfectly appropriate to have 
a hearing on the issue. 
Defendant was fully aware of how unusual this situation was insofar as the entity that 
really had a financial stake in the matter, the LifeFlight people, whoever they actually are, would 
probably not have standing to participate in the hearing. This concern was actually reviewed with 
the Industrial Commission for guidance. The Industrial Commission was reluctant to invite the 
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LifeFlight people to party. That being the case, the issue needing to be resolved, 
Defendant requested that the hearing be conducted by the Commissioners themselves, because 
the situation was unusual. 
A Notice of Hearing was issued on October 3, 2013, for a hearing to be conducted on 
October 30, 2013. Defense counsel called several telephone numbers he had available for the 
LifeFlight entity and on both occasions talked to a person who was unable or unwilling to 
provide any information. Defense counsel could neither ascertain what sort of protocol 
LifeFlight had in place to determine the types of injuries it would respond to or the 
circumstances under which it would respond. Defense counsel was unable to obtain from the 
LifeFlight people the names of anybody who would be willing to discuss whatever claim they 
had or resolve it. Defense counsel was unable to get from them the name and number of any in-
house lawyer they might have with whom he could discuss the matter. 
Faced with no meaningful response from LifeFlight Network, defense counsel, on 
October 9, 2013, wrote to the two separate addresses he had available for LifeFlight Network 
further laying out the case and enclosing all pleadings that had been generated in the case, as 
well as all evidence defense counsel intended to submit. This information contained all the 
contact information for defense counsel and Claimant's counsel. Defense counsel invited 
LifeFlight Network to take whatever action they deemed appropriate. This letter was sent by 
certified mail, and was received by LifeFlight Network on October 18, 2013, according to the 
return receipt confirmation. 
A hearing was held, at which time the medical records generated in the case were offered 
and admitted, including the paramedic records, the flight transport records, St. Alphonsus 
medical records, the records of Dr. Clawson, who concluded that the finger was not salvageable, 
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Department Elliott, followup 
records by Clawson. Finally, an opinion letter from Paul Collins to the effect that the 
LifeFlight services provided were unreasonable and unnecessary was offered and admitted. The 
LifeFlight bill was admitted into the record, as well as copies of the letters and the pleadings that 
defense counsel sent to LifeFlight Network along with the invitation to do whatever they felt 
they needed to do. 
II. 
FACTS 
Defendant Kevin Stokes is a farmer in Fruitland. (HT, p. 17, 11. 8-22). He hired Sohar 
Chavez, the claimant in this case, to help him with irrigation in April of 2012. (HT, p. 18, IL 6-
14). On the day of the accident Defendant Stokes got a phone call from Ada County Dispatch 
advising him that Claimant had been injured and where he was. (HT, p. 19, 11. 21-24). He went to 
the scene of the accident, at which time he found three Payette County paramedics, a Sheriffs 
deputy, and his uncle. Claimant was there as well. (HT, p. 20, IL 1 - 6). Claimant had obviously 
received first aid by the fact he was holding his hand up in the air elevated and it was bandaged. 
(HT, p. 20, 11. 9-12). Defendant Stokes immediately inquired as to what was going to happen 
next, and did not get an answer from any of the personnel there. (HT, p. 20, IL 15-19). He 
initiated the inquiry, because the ambulance was there and he couldn't figure out why they 
weren't taking Claimant to the hospital. (HT, p. 20, I. 22 p. 21, 1.). That was when he found 
out that a helicopter was going to show up, and he asked them why that was necessary. (HT, 
p.21, IL 1 - 15). Defendant Stokes did not believe that bringing LifeFlight into the equation was 
reasonable and expressed these concerns to the personnel on the scene. They did not respond to 
his inquiries in this regard. (HT, p. 21, IL 8-20). 
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St. Alphonsus Hospital Ontario, Oregon, three times at different times of the day. It took 15 
minutes at the longest, and 12 minutes at the shortest. (HT, p. 22, 11. 4 - 8). The distance between 
the accident scene and the ER door of St. Alphonsus in Ontario turned out to be 9.8 miles. (HT, 
p. 22, 11. 20-21). After Defendant Stokes showed up, it was at least 10 minutes until the 
helicopter showed up. (HT, p. 22, 1. 25 p. 23, 1. 1 ). 
Defendant Stokes has lived in the Fruitland area most of his life. He is aware that there 
are several orthopedic surgeons in the vicinity. (HT, p. 24, 11. 1-7). 
Later on in the evening Defendant Stokes received a phone call from Claimant at St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. Defendant Stokes drove over to Boise, picked up him, and 
took him home. During the drive home, Claimant asked him why he was flown to Boise -- that is 
to say, he did not know why he was flown to Boise. (HT, p. 27, 11. 5-10). 
Exhibits include the Form 1, which documents that the accident occurred on September 
8, 2012, at 5:00 p.m. The Form 1 establishes that Claimant was moving irrigation lines when his 
left hand got caught up in the chain of a motor. (Defendants' Exhibit 1). Payette Paramedic 
records establish that they responded to the incident on September 8, 2012, and that when they 
arrived, a language barrier prohibited them from learning how the injury had occurred or other 
"subjective information." These records document that some off-duty Payette County paramedic 
EMT made a request for LifeFlight Network. (Defendants' Exhibit 2). They do not document 
what if any conversation they had with Claimant as to what his desires were for treatment. Keep 
in mind, Defendant Stokes was there for at least IO minutes before the helicopter arrived and 
could have aided in the conversation with Claimant as to what his desires were had anyone made 
the attempt. 
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LifeFlight records document that a request came from Payette County EMTs for a 41-
year-old man who sustained an amputation of his pinky finger. (Defendants' Exhibit 3). These 
records do not establish any sort of a protocol for some sort of a triage review, which clearly 
should have occurred in order to determine whether using an asset that valuable and expensive 
was appropriate. The records do not establish any sort of critical situation or emergency that 
sought to be addressed in transporting Claimant to the hospital in this fashion. 
Records :from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center start with a September 8, 2012, 
Emergency Department report authored by Dr. Elliott, who quickly concluded that it was likely 
nonviable. He brought in Dr. Clawson to consult on definitive treatment. Dr. Clawson authored 
an Emergency Department Consultation the same date, September 8, 2012, noting an incomplete 
amputation of the left small finger at two levels. He reviewed x-rays and concluded that the 
finger was not salvageable. He then proceeded to complete the amputation and repair the stump. 
(Defendants' Exhibit 4). 
Dr. Clawson saw Claimant in followup on December 27, 2012, and noted that the stump 
was well healed. He noted that Claimant was medically stable and had suffered a 95% small 
finger impairment, which he noted corresponded to a 10% hand impairment, or 9% upper 
extremity impairment. He did not recommend any restrictions or followup care for Claimant. 
(Defendants' Exhibit 5). 
Defendant had the matter reviewed by Dr. Paul Collins, an orthopedic surgeon well 
known to the Industrial Commission, and as the Commissioners are aware, a gentleman who is 
quite familiar with the border counties, including Payette County, having practiced in Caldwell 
for many years. Dr. Collins concluded that the injury sustained by Claimant was "not in any way, 
shape or form, life critical." He pointed out that Claimant should have been taken to St. 
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Alphonsus in Ontario and worked up, and that if it turned out for some reason 
taken to for vascular reconstruction, there still would have been plenty of time to get that 
done. (Defendants' Exhibit 6). 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Specifically, the issue in front of the Industrial Commission is whether or not LifeFlight 
services and the charges for them were reasonable and necessary as envisioned by Idaho Code § 
72-432. However, Commission Baskin has requested briefing as to whether there could be a 
subsequent District Court action pursued by the LifeFlight Network leaving Claimant exposed. 
A. Is an Industrial Commission Finding Binding on a Non-Party. 
Claimant's counsel has filed a brief advising that there is exposure in District Court. In 
his opening statement at hearing, Mr. Owen understood that such could happen, and he was 
hoping that an Industrial Commission ruling on the matter, should the Industrial Commission 
decide that the LifeFlight services were not reasonable or necessary, would be of help - i.e. 
would work to discourage LifeFlight from pursuing the matter. Defense counsel pointed out in 
his opening statement at hearing that the issue was whether the LifeFlight service was reasonable 
and necessary under Idaho Code § 72-432. Defense counsel pointed out that the Industrial 
Commission had exclusive jurisdiction for this determination under Idaho Code § 72-432, which 
is on its face clear since that statute is within the Workers' Compensation Act and per Idaho 
Code § 72-707, the Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to decide this issue. 
Defense counsel is not going to go into a lengthy analysis of whether LifeFlight Network 
can be bound by an Industrial Commission decision and precluded from pursuing recovery under 
some other theory in another forum. Obviously, LifeFlight Network is not a party to this action, 
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as such, cannot bound under some res judicata, collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion. Similarly, anybody for the cost of a filing fee can file anything in District Court they 
want. That, however, does not mean that they will prevail, nor does it mean that the risk of a 
subsequent claim in another forum is unique to this situation. It is a risk in any situation where 
the Industrial Commission finds that a medical service is not compensable, be the reason failure 
of notice, causation, service provided outside the chain of referral, or reasonable and necessary 
under LC. § 72-432. Defense counsel does not know what theory LifeFlight would assert should 
they at some point show up and make a claim, and because defense counsel does not know what 
theory they might employ, defense counsel cannot comment on what statute of limitations as to 
any such claim might apply. 
Prior to the hearing, defense counsel, with the knowledge of Claimant's counsel, 
contacted the Industrial Commission in order to address concerns about LifeFlight Network's 
participation in the hearing requested by Claimant's counsel. The question was whether or not 
the Industrial Commission wanted to grant a medical provider standing to assert its claim. The 
Industrial Commission did not want to do so for perfectly valid reasons. There is absolutely 
nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act that would grant standing to a medical provider to 
participate as a party in a workers' compensation proceeding. The Industrial Commission has 
never done so on a straightforward substantive question as to the entitlement of benefits under 
the Act. 
As Claimant's counsel pointed out in his brief, there are, however, at least two occasions 
where medical providers have argued both before the Industrial Commission and the Idaho 
Supreme Court on matters that arose out of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
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Claimant's makes note of the fact a medical provider had argued in matters 
before the Industrial Commission in St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130 
Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997), and in the case of Williams of Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 
51,260 P.3d 1186 (2011). In the first instance, the case was tried on the substantive merits of the 
claim between the claimant, the surety, and the employer without the presence of any medical 
provider. The claimant prevailed. After the fact, a dispute arose, because St. Al's was not willing 
to concede a fee to the claimant's counsel for his efforts in securing a recovery at the hearing on 
the substantive merits, which resulted in an award that inured largely to the benefit of St. 
Alphonsus. It is true that the Industrial Commission allowed St. Alphonsus to argue on its own 
petition for declaratory ruling. This was not an evidentiary hearing. The Industrial Commission 
did not make clear at that time the basis upon which it was allowing St. Alphonsus to proceed. 
The Williams case was a declaratory judgment action initially brought and entered into by 
the claimant's counsel and counsel for Blue Cross of Idaho to resolve a dispute as to whether or 
not the claimant's counsel had to honor a Blue Cross subro. Again, this was not any sort of 
evidentiary hearing on the substantive merits of the underlying worker's compensation claim; it 
was basically a dispute over issues arising out of matters of law and equity. In both cases, the 
medical provider wanted to argue before the Industrial Commission. There is no indication in the 
present matter that LifeFlight Network wanted to participate in an Industrial Commission inquiry 
as to the reasonableness and necessity for the LifeFlight service under Idaho Code § 72-432. 
There does not appear to be a statutory basis for the Industrial Commission to compel them to 
appear and argue as a party in the current proceedings. 
Defense counsel does not wish to be misunderstood. If the Industrial Commission thinks 
they can compel LifeFlight Network into proceeding as a party and to be bound by the 
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proceedings, then have at it If the Industrial Commission feels that calling medical providers to 
participate in and present evidence in substantive proceedings in workers' compensation claims 
a good thing and that they have the authority to compel such participation, that is their affair, 
but defense counsel can think of no statute or decision that would support such. 
LifeFlight Network showing up in this case is not going to make any difference in the 
ultimate outcome. LifeFlighting Claimant Chavez when he was just under 10 miles from St. 
Alphonsus Hospital in Ontario to St. Alphonsus in Boise was poorly thought out. Defense 
counsel cannot envision any argument that LifeFlight Network people could make to the 
contrary. There simply was no reason and no excuse to do what was done. However, if the 
Commission is asking for defense counsel's opinion in the matter, defense counsel does not see 
any basis upon which the Industrial Commission could compel participation, and defense 
counsel can think of a lot of reasons consistent with the mandate that workers' compensation 
proceedings be summary and simple proceedings as to why medical providers who might have a 
stake in the outcome of the proceedings and whose employees may very well constitute a 
substantial portion of the expert testimony to be offered maybe should not be parties to the 
proceeding. If you want to find out the finer points of discovery and motion practice, invite a 
bunch of hospital attorneys to participate in the workers' compensation hearings. 
It is true that LifeFlight Network might contest the Industrial Commission's finding in 
another forum. However, that is potentially true in any case where the Industrial Commission 
finds a medical service unreasonable and/or unnecessary. There is nothing special about this 
case. The fact remains, an issue under LC. § 72-432 has been framed up and a hearing held at the 
request of Claimant. The Industrial Commission is now tasked with the responsibility of deciding 
the issue based upon the evidence submitted. 
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Idaho Code § 72-432 concerns the compensability of medical services. Subsection (1) of 
the statute requires the employer to provide "reasonable medical" . . . "as may be reasonably 
required by the employee's physician," or "needed immediately after an injury" ... "and for a 
time thereafter." The case of Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 
395, is often cited as the end-all/be-all for questions of reasonableness and necessity under Idaho 
Code § 72-432. It is not. In Sprague, both the Industrial Commission and the Idaho Supreme 
Court grappled with the compensability of some chiropractic bills submitted by Dr. Downey. Dr. 
Downey had treated the claimant from the inception of his injury and for a considerable period of 
time. The surety made several runs at trying to end the chiropractic care by means of soliciting 
opinions from a couple of orthopedic surgeons as to the question of whether the claimant needed 
any further chiropractic are. At some point Chiropractor Downey got tired of the exercise and 
declared the claimant at maximum medical improvement. The surety paid his bill up through that 
date. Everything would have been fine, except that the claimant returned a week later seeking 
more treatment, and that treatment extended over a number of months to the tune of $1,848.96, 
which the surety declined to pay. The Industrial Commission opinion in the Sprague case, 
written by Referee Robert Youngstrom, concludes, stating: 
It is apparent that the forgoing statute requires that for medical treatment to be 
compensable under the Workman's Compensation law, it must be reasonable 
treatment, it must be required by the physician, it must be necessitated by the 
accident, and be rendered within a reasonable time thereafter. The Referee 
concludes that the claimant has failed to sustain his burden of proving that the 
treatment at issue in this case falls within the statutory provisions. The Referee 
therefore recommends that the Commission deny Claimant's request for 
reimbursement for the treatment by Dr. Downey subsequent to April 10, 1985. 
While Referee Youngstrom was known for the brevity of his decisions, this one was 
perhaps a little too vague, inviting scrutiny from the Idaho Supreme Court. From reading the 
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Findings of Fact contained within the decision, it is clear that Referee Youngstrom made note of 
the fact that Dr. Downey, the chiropractor, was a treating physician, that the claimant and he felt 
that the claimant needed the treatment, and that the claimant improved somewhat with the 
treatment. It would appear that Referee Youngstrom was concerned that neither the claimant nor 
the chiropractor had requested authorization for these additional 34 treatments at any point in 
time during the treatment, and it was obvious that he was concerned that the record did not 
contain any explanation from Dr. Downey as to how or why the continued treatment was related 
to the original injury caused by the accident, particularly as Dr. Downey had declared him at 
maximum medical improvement from the accident prior to providing the contested treatment. 
The point of this would be Referee Youngstrom was concerned about an accident making 
necessary the treatment offered. 
Justice Bistline, who by the way loved to take issue with Referee Youngstrom as is well 
known amongst anyone who practiced in the area of workers' compensation laws in the eighties, 
authored a decision reversing the Industrial Commission denial, which has been confusing 
practitioners ever since the opinion was issued in 1989. Instead of remanding to Referee 
Youngstrom in order to find out exactly why he held what he held, he concluded that the 
Industrial Commission had found that the medical treatment provided by Dr. Downey was not 
"reasonable." He dismissed whatever concerns Referee Youngstrom had with the necessity 
requirement by stating that the Industrial Commission decision, "incorrectly focuses on the 
necessity of treatment, rather than on whether it was reasonable and was required by Sprague's 
physician." Sprague, 16 Idaho 720 at p. 723 (Decision Filed May 12, 1989). He did not share 
with us why necessity in this instance was not of concern. Justine Bistline then went on to state: 
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It is for the physician, not the Commission, to decide whether the treatment is 
required. The only review the Commission is entitled to make of the 
physician's decision is whether the treatment was reasonable. 
He does not explain what the difference is between the physician's decision that treatment is 
required and the Industrial Commission's subsequent review of that decision process to 
determine whether the treatment was reasonable. The decision and this language are often cited, 
but defense counsel is hard-pressed to figure out why. It really does not tell us very much other 
than the Court did not like the Industrial Commission decision, which failed to specify its 
concerns and that the majority disagreed and wanted Dr. Downey paid. 
In workers' compensation law, as in most areas of the law, the review of the provision of 
medical treatment is done by a commonsense analysis as to whether or not the treatment either 
proposed or provided was reasonable and was necessary. These terms are used in a number of 
contexts and for a number of reasons. Sometimes an analysis of what is reasonable or not 
reasonable has to do with costs. Thus, we grapple with questions as to whether a very expensive 
medical treatment, be it a spinal cord implant or a bionic leg that costs well over $100,000.00, is 
reasonable medical treatment in the context of the facts presented in the particular claim in front 
of us. Sometimes those treatments may be reasonable, and in other cases they may not. 
Sometimes it is not the service, but the charge that is challenged. Similarly, questions regarding 
necessity sometimes have to do with causation i.e. was the need for the treatment truly caused 
by the injury or some other factor did the injury make necessary the treatment. From those 
individuals who have a long history of chronic low back pain, we know that the mere occurrence 
of an accident and further insult to the low back does not always mean that the employer and 
surety are responsible for back care for the rest of the claimant's life. Sometimes they are, and 
sometimes they aren't, depending upon the facts of the case and the opinions of the experts. 
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Sometimes necessity is used in the context of whether a particular service was needed to treat a 
particular condition - 1s use a hyperbaric chamber to treat a common wrist sprain 
necessary. In the latter scenario, necessity is much like an inquiry as to reasonableness. 
The point of all this is, the review by the Industrial Commission is a commonsense 
matter, and any factual proposition put forward, whether the opinion of an expert witness or a 
factual statement by a witness, should be subject to challenge. No one made Dr. Downey God in 
the Sprague case, although Justine Bistline tried mightily. Every time the Industrial Commission 
has to weigh between the conflicting evidence of two physicians and pick one opinion over 
another, they reaffirm that such matters are subject to review. 
In the present case, Claimant was less than 10 miles from the local hospital that has 
served people on the western end of Treasure Valley forever. While Defendant Employer does 
not wish to make light of Claimant's injury, on the scale of things, it was not a major injury. 
There is nothing in the medical records before the Industrial Commission that would lead anyone 
to believe Claimant Chavez was in a life threatening situation or that his situation was in any 
way critical. There is nothing in the record that would indicate who made the decision to 
LifeFlight Claimant and whether that individual would meet the statutory criteria to be 
considered a "physician" capable of making a decision such as was made in this instance. There 
is no explanation in the record as to why Claimant could not have been transported to St. 
Alphonsus Hospital in Ontario and worked up there for assessment as to whether re-attachment 
was an option, as well as decision making as to whether that facility could perform the procedure 
or whether Claimant needed to be transported to St. Alphonsus in Boise. It does not appear that 
the ultimate decision that the tissue was not viable, as made by Dr. Elliott and Dr. Clawson at St. 
Alphonsus in Boise, was a very difficult assessment for them to make. The only medical opinion 
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as to whether or not LifeFiight trip was compensable under Idaho § 72-432 comes in 
the form of Dr. Paul 
amongst other things, that 
comments as contained in his April 9, 2013 letter. He concludes, 
is evident that this is a fifth finger crushing/tearing type injury that 
was not in any way, shape or form, life critical." He expresses some consternation as to why 
Claimant was not simply taken to St. Alphonsus in Ontario. He opines that LifeFlight was "in no 
way necessary." He concludes that the helicopter trip was unjustified. Dr. Collins clearly 
believes that the LifeFlight trip to Boise was unreasonable and unnecessary. 
In this day and age of escalating medical costs, both the workers' compensation system 
and the nation at large struggle with ways to keep medical costs under control. The starting point 
in any such attempt is to hold medical providers accountable for what they do. They must be 
thoughtful and reasonable in what they do. If we do not demand that of them, then rest assured 
they will become thoughtless and unaccountable. In this instance, there was no reason to take 
this man directly to St. Alphonsus in Boise. He was not in critical condition, and while time is 
somewhat of an issue when you are considering or contemplating a revascularization procedure, 
it was in no way critical in this instance, as any simple Google search would reveal and as noted 
by Dr. Collins in his letter. Someone involved in the LifeFlight operation made a mistake, and 
that should remain their problem, not the problem of Claimant Sohar Chavez, nor should it be 
Mr. Stokes' problem. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Defense counsel understands that the current case and how it has come before the 
Commission is awkward. Frankly, the inquiry is simply a matter of whether the LifeFlight 
services rendered to Claimant Sohar Chavez in any way, shape, or form were reasonable or 
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necessary, as they must be to satisfy § 72-432. The issue was framed up and a hearing was 
requested by Claimant. parties attended the hearing and put on their case. 1s no 
evidence in front of the Industrial Commission at present as to who actually called LifeFlight, let 
alone who actually authorized LifeFlight to respond. There is no evidence in the record of the 
qualifications of whatever individual or individuals made these decisions, let alone whether they 
were competent as a matter of law or otherwise physicians as that term is defined in the 
Workers' Compensation Act. There is no evidence in the record to explain why LifeFlight 
services were necessary for such a modest injury, and there is nothing that can be gleaned from 
the medical records generated in this case from which one can conclude why Claimant Sohar 
Chavez was LifeFlighted to Boise. 
The records reflect that somebody who remains unnamed thought that the finger tissue 
might be viable and reattachment attempted. We do not know who this individual is, we do not 
know what credentials this individual has, and we do not know what information this individual 
had at his disposal to believe such was the case. We do not know whether this individual lived in 
Payette, and if so, why it would not have occurred to this individual that a much better 
assessment could be done at St. Alphonsus in Ontario, where x-ray machines and real physicians 
were available to make this very expensive decision. There is no explanation in the record as to 
why Claimant could not have been taken to St. Alphonsus in Ontario and worked up and treated 
adequately without the expense of LifeFlight. There is no explanation in the record as to why 
Claimant could not have been taken to St. Alphonsus in Ontario and worked up, and even if it 
turned out transportation to St. Alphonsus in Boise was necessary in order to attempt 
revascularization of the finger, why that assessment could not have been made at St. Alphonsus 
in Ontario. The only evidence in the record offered is that offered by Defendants in the form of 
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Paul Collins' testimony to the that there was absolutely no need for LifeFlight to 
itself into the treatment Claimant Sohar Chavez as they did. 
The issue of reasonableness and necessity has been framed up and the matter put to the 
Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission is the body chosen by the Idaho Legislature 
to determine whether medical treatment is compensable under Idaho Code § 72-432. The record 
in this case does not support any finding other than LifeFlight services in this instance were 
unreasonable and unnecessary. That being the case, the Industrial Commission should enter its 
order finding that the LifeFlight services were not reasonable, were not necessary, and are not 
compensable under the workers' compensation laws of the State of Idaho under Idaho Code §72-
432. 
The possibility that Claimant might face a claim in another forum is troubling, but at the 
end of the day, not relevant to the resolution of the issue before the Industrial Commission. Any 
such possibility is speculative in any event. 
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BEFORE 
SOHAR CHAVEZ, 
v. 
KEVIN STOKES, 
Claimant, 
Employer, 
Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE 
IC 2012-025814 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled 
matter to Referee Michael E. Powers, who conducted a hearing in Boise on October 30, 2013. 
Claimant was not present but was represented by Richard S. Owen of Nampa who appeared on 
Claimant's behalf. R. Daniel Bowen of Boise represented uninsured Employer, Kevin Stokes, 
who was also present. Oral and documentary evidence was presented. No post-hearing 
depositions were taken. The parties were asked to submit post-hearing briefs. This matter came 
under advisement on May 15, 2014 and is now ready for decision. 
Due to the unusual procedural facts present in this case, the Commissioners hereby issue 
their own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whether the transport of Claimant by St. Alphonsus Life 
Flight ("Life Flight") constituted reasonable treatment pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-432. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends that the Commission should stay the proceedings and order the 
medical provider Life Flight be brought into the proceedings. Employer contends that the Life 
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Flight transport charge is unreasonable under the circumstances Claimant's and that 
Employer should not be required to cover the cost of the transport. He relies on the opinions of 
Mark C. Clawson, M.D. and Paul C. Collins, M.D. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the following: 
1. The testimony of Employer, Kevin Stokes, taken at the hearing; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits A and B, admitted at hearing; and 
3. Employer's Exhibits 1-10, admitted at the hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employer testified that he owns a farm in Fruitland and employed Claimant as a 
part-time irrigator. Hearing Transcript, pp. 17-18. 
2. On September 8, 2012, Employer received a call from Payette County Dispatch 
that Claimant had been injured. Hearing Transcript p. 19. 
3. On September 8, 2012, Claimant suffered a partial amputation of his small finger 
when his left hand slipped into the chain of a motor on the irrigation line he was moving on one 
of Employer's properties in the Payette/Fruitland area. Hearing Transcript, pg. 18; Defendant's 
Exhibits 2 and 4. 
4. Claimant drove himself to the home of an off-duty Payette County Police Officer, 
who called 911. Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
5. Payette County Paramedics EMTs arrived at the scene of Claimant's accident. 
Claimant was "writhing and moaning and appear[ ed] in considerable pain." Claimant had also 
"vomited once". It was determined that Claimant's small finger was salvageable. Defendant's 
Exhibit 2. 
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6. Flight was called and transported Claimant to St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center in Boise. Defendant's Exhibit 3. 
7. The tip of Claimant's finger could not be reattached and a revision amputation 
was performed on his left small finger at the distal portion of the proximal phalanx. Defendant's 
Exhibit 5. 
8. Life Flight sent Claimant a statement on September 12, 2012 with a due balance 
of $21,201.00 for the transport. Defendant's Exhibit 8. 
9. Employer is not insured for workers' compensation purposes on the advice of his 
accountant. Hearing Transcript, p. 19, 11. 1-19. 
10. The only bill for Claimant's treatment not paid by Employer is the bill at issue 
from Life Flight. Hearing Transcript, p.6, 11.7-13. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
11. The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical 
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Facts, however, 
need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v. 
Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992). 
REASONABLENESS OF CLAIMANT'S TREATMENT. 
12. Idaho Code § 72-432(1) requires an employer to provide for an injured employee 
such reasonable medical, surgical, or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, 
medicines, crutches and apparatus, as may be reasonably required by the employee's physician 
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or needed immediately after an injury. 1 If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured 
employee may do so at the expense of the employer. 
13. For the purposes of Idaho Code § 72-432(1), medical treatment is reasonable if 
the employee's physician requires the treatment and it is for the physician to decide whether the 
treatment is required. Mulder v. Liberty Northwest Insurance Company, 135 Idaho 52, 58, 14 
P.3d 372,402,408 (2000). 
14. The only review the Commission is entitled to make of the physician's decision is 
whether the treatment was reasonable. Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 
722, 779 P.2d 395,397 (1989). 
15. Idaho Code § 72-102 (25) defines a physician as "medical physicians and 
surgeons, ophthalmologists, otorhinolaryngologists, dentists, osteopaths, osteopathic physicians 
and surgeons, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractic physicians, and members of any other 
healing profession licensed or authorized by the statutes of this state to practice such profession 
within the scope of their practice as defined by the statutes of this state and as authorized by their 
licenses." 
16. Idaho Code §56-1012 (14) defines an "emergency medical technician" as "a 
person who has met the qualifications for licensure as set forth in sections 56-1011 through 
56-1023, Idaho Code, is licensed by the EMS bureau under sections 56-1011 through 56-1023, 
Idaho Code, carries out the practice of emergency care within the scope of practice determined 
1 As we have noted in the past, Employer's obligation to provide treatment under Idaho Code 
§ 72-432(1) is stated in the disjunctive. Richan v. Arla G. Lott Trucking Inc., 2011 UC 0008.4 
(Feb. 7, 2011). Because we find that the care in question was ordered by Claimant's "physician" 
we need not consider whether the helicopter ride would also qualify as "reasonable" care 
"needed" immediately after the industrial accident. However, based on our conclusion that the 
care required by Claimant's "physician" was reasonable, we think it likely that the care would 
also be found "reasonable" and "needed" under the second part of the disjunctive. 
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the [Idaho medical services physician] commission and practices under the 
supervision of an Idaho licensed physician. 
1 7. The Idaho Code defines "paramedic" as a "person who has met the qualifications 
for licensure as set forth in sections 56-1011 through 56-1023, Idaho code" who "is licensed by 
the EMS bureau under sections 56-1011 through 56-1023, Idaho Code, carries out the practice of 
emergency care within the scope of practice determined by the [Idaho emergency medical 
services physician] commission and practices under the supervision of an Idaho licensed 
physician." Idaho Code§ 56-1012 (19). 
18. The record does not clarify if the responders to Claimant's injury were 
paramedics or EMTs. For the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient that both are licensed by 
the state of Idaho. 
19. The distinction between state licensing and non-licensing for purposes of 
establishing who qualifies as a "physician" was discussed in Oliveros v. Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., 
2012 IIC 0094.6 (Nov. 2, 2012). In Oliveros, Claimant sought payment for prosthetic fingers via 
a prosthetist although his primary physician opined they were not functional, only cosmetic. We 
held that because the "state of Idaho does not license prosthetists and has no statutory framework 
that authorizes the profession within the meaning of Idaho Code § 72-102 (25) [ ... ] it is clear that 
[Claimant's prosthetist] cannot, in the first place, even qualify as a 'physician' for the purpose of 
requiring certain treatment for Claimant." As both paramedics and EMTs are authorized and 
licensed by the State of Idaho, we are persuaded that the Payette County Paramedics EMTs who 
responded to Claimant's injury meet the definition of a "physician" for purposes of Idaho Code 
§ 72-102 (25). 
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20. Claimant's accident happened on or about 5:00 Defendant's Exhibit 
Upon his arrival, Employer observed three Payette County paramedics EMTs and a deputy 
Sheriff. Employer testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Bowen): When you got there, what was Mr. Chavez's situation? 
A (By Mr. Stokes): He was sitting on a bench on the deck of the sheriff deputy's 
house. One of the paramedics had his hand up in the air, had Mr. Chavez's 
hand up in the air, elevated. It was bandaged. You know, I talked to him 
briefly, Mr. Chavez, asked, you know, how he was, and then tried to talk to 
the paramedics, you know, what's happening, you know, what are we 
doing now. They didn't respond to me, basically brushed me off, but 
eventually one of the paramedics who was brand new on the job said she 
didn't know what was happening, so ... 
Q: The reason you were inquiring was you were wondering why he wasn't 
already being taken to Holy Rosary?2 
A. Exactly. You know, like I said, they had him already bandaged and, you 
know, their ambulance was sitting there, you know, five, ten yards away 
and, you know, doors open and I thought, well, let's get him going, you 
know, and like I said, no one would answer me. I asked the sheriff's 
deputy and he said the bird was on its way, and that's when I asked, you 
know, why and not one would answer that. I got nothing from anyone after 
that. 
Hearing Transcript, pp. 20-21. 
21. According to the Prehospital Care Report, "Off duty Payette County Paramedics 
EMT land-lines Medic 20 and advises finger may be able to be surgically fixed. Life Flight 
Network is requested to launch." Defendant's Exhibit 2.3 
2 
"Holy Rosary" Medical Center as used throughout the records refers to the previous name of 
St. Alphonsus Medical Center Ontario. 
3 The record leaves us unable to determine whether it was "Medic 20" or the onsite paramedic 
EMT who actually ordered that Claimant be flown to Boise. Nor do we know anything about 
who or what Medic 20 may be. However, since the onsite paramedic EMT sought medical 
approval from Medic 20, it stands to reason that Medic 20 is a "physician" with equal or greater 
credentials than the onsite paramedic EMT. 
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~,u,,,,,~,,. was taken by Life Flight to the St. Alphonsus - Boise 
department. Hand specialist Mark Clawson, M.D. took over his treatment once Claimant 
arrived. Dr. Clawson deemed Claimant's severed finger irreparable and performed a revision 
amputation. Defendant's Exhibit 5. 
23. Defendant contends that because Claimant's industrial injury occurred 
approximately 15 minutes from St. Alphonsus - Ontario in Oregon, it was not reasonable to fly 
Claimant to St. Alphonsus - Boise. However, the Commission is disinclined to join Defendant in 
that conclusion. As was elucidated in Sprague, "LC. § 72-432(1) obligates the employer to 
provide treatment, if the employee's physician requires the treatment and if the treatment is 
reasonable. It is for the physician, not the Commission, to decide whether the treatment is 
required." Sprague at 722. Both the paramedic EMT on the scene of the industrial injury and 
Medic 20 had the authority to call for Life Flight under the terms of their respective licenses and 
Life Flight responded accordingly. 
24. Reasonableness may be established via three factors established by the Idaho 
Supreme Court: 1) The claimant made gradual improvement from the treatment received; 2) The 
treatment was required by the claimant's physician, and 3) The treatment received was within the 
physician's standard of practice, the charges for which were fair, reasonable, and similar to 
charges in the same profession. Sprague at 722-723, 3 97-3 98. 
25. In the instant case, Claimant did indeed lose the end of his pinky finger, but the 
quality of the amputation performed by Dr. Clawson is not under dispute. The flight to 
St. Alphonsus Boise resulted in a "well healed and contoured" small finger. Defendant's 
Exhibit 5. Defendant does not question if the amputation was reasonable, his focus is instead on 
the reasonableness of the transport itself. Finally, the record provides no persuasive evidence 
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that the eost of the flight as called was unfair or unreasonable. Under the conditions Sprague, 
Claimant's transport was a reasonable part of his treatment of his industrial injury. 
26. Defendant further contends that because the tip of Claimant's finger was not 
ultimately viable for reattachment, the decision to call for Life Flight was not reasonable. This 
argument ignores that following the injury, a trained paramedic EMT or similarly licensed 
person within the EMS chain of authority established by the Idaho Code, i.e. Claimant's 
"physician", made the determination that it was possible to reattach the tip of Claimant's finger 
and that taking him to St. Alphonsus - Boise was Claimant's best chance of success for the 
procedure. Neither the type of injury nor the quality of the treatment Claimant received at St. 
Alphonsus Boise is at issue. 
27. As we discussed in Page v. A1cCain Foods, Inc., "Sprague and its progeny have 
not created a rule that medical care is compensable only when it is successful. [ ... ] [M]edical 
care does not always work. That does not mean the claimant must bear the costs of failed 
treatment." 2009 IIC 0424.7 (Sept. 8, 2009). If the finger had been reattached successfully, 
would Defendant be so adamantly opposed to covering Claimant's Life Flight expenses? 
According to Idaho Workers' Compensation law precedent, the ultimate outcome of the 
treatment is neither the only nor an infallible indicator of reasonable treatment, but one factor in 
a more comprehensive analysis. We reiterate the language used in Campagni v. The Disney 
Store, "The evaluation of an injured worker's entitlement to medical treatment should not be 
made on the basis of retrospective analysis of whether the treatment proved efficacious." 2013 
IIC 0029.27 (April 12, 2013). 
28. Defendant also claims that "[s]omeone involved in the LifeFlight [sic] operation 
made a mistake, and that should remain their problem." Defendant's post-hearing brief, p. 15. 
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1s no record that the call for transport was a mistake. The mere fact that 
Defendant does not want to pay for the service is insufficient to establish that a mistake was 
made. 
29. Paul C. Collins, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Boise, opined in an 
April 9, 2013 letter to Employer's counsel: 
Having reviewed the case and specifically, as an example, the x-ray report 
of 09/08/12, it is evident that this is a 5th finger crushing/tearing type 
injury that was not in any way, shape, or form, life critical. For that 
reason I do not understand why Life Flight was called or addressed in the 
first place, and why the case was not taken to Holy Rosary. Indeed, it is 
extremely reasonable that the patient would be taken physically to Holy 
Rosary Hospital. Had there been an incident which may in some way 
benefitted from a vascular reconstruction, then the patient could be 
transferred to St. Alphonsus or St. Lukes. Indeed, this was in no way 
necessary. 
Defendant's Exhibit 6, p.55. According to Defendant's post-hearing brief, "Dr. Collins clearly 
believes that the LifeFlight [sic] trip to Boise was unreasonable and unnecessary." P. 15. 
Dr. Collins was not Claimant's physician, nor was he present or involved in Claimant's 
treatment. Under the particular facts of this case, we find the on-site Payette County Paramedics 
EMT and Medic 20's emergency treatment decision more persuasive than the opinion of 
Dr. Collins on the issue ofreasonableness of the call for Claimant's transport. 
30. The Commission is not unsympathetic to the peculiar facts present in this case. As 
Defendant points out in his Post-Hearing Brief, "[t]here is no explanation in the record as to why 
Claimant could not have been taken to St. Alphonsus in Ontario and worked up, and even if it 
turned out transportation to St. Alphonsus in Boise was necessary in order to attempt 
revascularization of the finger, why that assessment could not have been made at St. Alphonsus 
in Ontario." P.16. The Commission agrees that record before us is sparse. However, the statutes 
that bind the Commission ask if the treatment was "reasonably required by the employee's 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 9 
physician or needed immediately after an injury." Idaho Code § 72-432(1). Through the record 
before us, we find that the transport of Claimant was reasonable. 
CLAJA,,JANT'S REQUEST TO STAY PROCEEDINGS. 
31. In his supplemental brief, Claimant requests the Commission to stay the 
proceedings and order that Life Flight be brought in as a party. Based on the evidence submitted 
by the parties, we believe to further stay the proceedings would be inappropriate. We therefore 
decline to rule on this issue as per our discretionary power to grant a joint hearing "analogous to 
IRCP 42(a)". Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 299, 859 P.2d 330, 335 
(1993). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Based on the forgoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The treatment Claimant received from Life Flight following his industrial accident on 
September 8, 2012 was reasonable under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1). 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this Decision is final and conclusive as to all matters 
adjudicated. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIO OF LAW, AND ORDER was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
RICHARD S. OWEN 
PO BOX278 
NAMPA, ID 83653 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701-1007 
ka 
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R. DANIEL BOWEN (ISB #2673) 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
1311 W. JEFFERSON ST. 
P.O. BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701-1007 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
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BE:FORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSON OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SOHAR CHAVEZ, 
Claimant, 
V. 
KEVIN STC°KES, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I.C. No: 2012-025814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, Sohar Chavez and counsel of record: 
1. The above-named Defendant/Appellant, Kevin Stokes, Employer, appeals against 
the above-named Claimant/Respondent, Sohar Chavez, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Industrial Commission Order entered in the above-entitled proceedings on the 26th day of 
September, 2014, Chairman Thomas P. Baskin presiding. 
2. That Defendant/Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the Order described in paragraph 1, above, is an appealable Order insomuch as it is an Industrial 
Commission final Order, including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to the 
provisions of LC.§ 72-718. Defendant/Appellant make this appeal pursuant to Rule 1 l(d) I.A.R., 
and LC.§§ 72-718 and 724. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
3. The issue for review is whether reasonable and competent evidence exists to 
support the Industrial Commission's conclusion that transporting a worker's compensation 
claimant by air ambulance (Life Flight helicopter) at a cost in excess of $20,000.00 where the 
injury was non-life threatening damage to the pinky finger when the claimant was otherwise 
within minutes of Holy Rosary, his local hospital, was reasonable and necessary medical 
treatment under Idaho Code§ 72-432. 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested in its entirety as to the hearing in this matter, 
which occurred on October 30, 2013. (Said transcript has previously been prepared). 
5. Defendant/Appellant requests the following documents to be included m the 
Agency's Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a) All exhibits admitted into evidence as a part of the hearing process; 
b) All briefing submitted by the parties; 
c) Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law authored by Referee 
Michael E. Powers, who conducted the October 30, 2013 hearing and whose proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not utilized by the Industrial 
Commissioners in making their decision; and 
d) The April 7, 2014 letter authored by Chairman Thomas P. Baskin to 
Claimant's counsel and defense counsel requesting briefing. 
6. Undersigned certifies that: 
a) The Clerk of the Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of 
$100.00 for preparation of the Clerk's Record; 
b) The appellate filing fee in the amount of $94.00 is being paid herewith; 
c) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, LA.R. 
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r--J. DATED this day of October, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HERE] :Y CERTIFY that on the 3 r4._day of October, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing dccument was served upon the following party(ies) in the method indicated: 
RICHARD S OWEN ESQ 
OWEN & FARNEY ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
PO BOX :·,7g 
NAMPA :D 83653 
FAX: (200 466-3399 
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I, DENA K. BURKE, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy 
of the NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED OCTOBER 1, 2014; and THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER ENTERED 
SEPTEMBER 26, 2014, herein, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2012-025814 
for Claimant name SOHAR CHAVEZ. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this ____ day of __ O_C_T_O_B_E_R ___ , 2014. 
.. ~ - z. . . ·:. DenaK. Burke :. _ : S ~· 
Assistant Commission Secreta\7 \ · 
.. .·•· ~.~ .... ; .· ... ; . 
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CERTIFICATION 
SUPREME COURT OF THE 
SOHAR 
Claimant-Respondent, SUPREME COURT 
v. 
KEVIN STOKES, 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
OF SOHAR CHAVEZ 
Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh presiding. 
TC 2012-025814 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ENTERED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 
R. DANIEL BOWEN 
P.O. BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701 
RICHARDS. OWEN 
P.O. BOX 278 
NAMPA, ID 83653 
KEVIN STOKES, Defendant 
SO HAR CHAVEZ, Claimant 
OCTOBER 3, 2014 
$94.00 SC Fee paid & $100 Industrial Commission deposit paid 
M. DEAN WILLIS, CSR NO. 95 
P.O. BOX 1241 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
The entire standard transcript has been requested. 
The standard transcript has been red and 
is on file with the Industrial 
oc~~r 
Dena K. Burke 
Assistant Commission 
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CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 42589 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement 
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. 
DATED this 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SO HAR CHAVEZ, 
Claimant-Respondent, 
V. 
KEVIN STOKES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42589 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
R. Daniel Bowen for the Appellants; and 
Richard S. Owen for the Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
R DANIEL BOWEN 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 
Attorney for Respondent(s): 
RICHARDS OWEN 
PO BOX 278 
NAMPA ID 83653 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
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In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this day 2014. 
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